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Abstract: This paper reports the findings of an in-depth case study 
of a highly densely populated area in the Northwest of Rwanda 
which has been conducted during the period 1988-1993. It 
demonstrates that acute competition for land in a context 
characterized by too slow expansion of non-agricultural income 
opportunities has resulted in increasingly unequal land distribution 
and rapid processes of land dispossession through both operation 
of the (illegal) land market and evolution of indigenous tenure 
arrangements. It is also shown that pervasive incidence of land 
disputes and the threat of landlessness have led to rising tensions 
in social relations and even within the core of family li&, thus paving 
the way for more and more overt expressions of disharmony and 
violence. A connection between these ominous conditions and the 
civil rear that broke out in 1994 is established. 
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I. Objective and framework of the study*  
 
The statement of the problem 
 
The question of which land tenure system is appropriate for present-day Sub-
Saharan Africa (henceforth denoted by SSA) has come to the foreground of 
discussions of structural reforms in the agricultural sector of African countries. This 
is so because there is much worry not only about the stagnation of agricultural 
production and the mismanagement of natural resources in these countries but also 
about the allocation problems that inevitably arise when land becomes scarce and 
there are no well-defined, legally sanctioned rights to protect the land possessors. 
 
An important strand of the economic literature makes the point that nothing 
short of full-fledged land titling or fully developed private property rights (including 
the right to freely dispose of the land without requiring any sort of approval) can 
maintain the growth potential of (African) regions subject to rapid population growth 
and increasing commercialization of agriculture [see, e.g., Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 
197?; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Posner, 1977; Ault and Rutman, 1979; Feeny, 
1988]. It strongly emphasizes the positive economic effects that will result from 
formal registration of land rights, on the planes of allocative efficiency as well as 
capital accumulation and resource conservation. 
 
Very few countries in SSA have actually followed that path. The most 
outstanding case is Kenya (where land pressure is indeed very acute) which has 
had the most extensive land registration program over the past three or four 
decades and has therefore attracted a lot of attention from researchers interested in 
assessing the impact of individualized land titling. Contrary to the optimistic 
predictions of the property rights doctrine, however, the evidence accumulated so 
far raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of land titling as a means to 
enhance agricultural growth and to increase security of tenure in SSA [for recent 
surveys, see Atwood, 1990; Bruce, 1993; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Platteau, 
1996]i. More specifically, empirical studies tend to show that land registration 
creates room for increased insecurity among vulnerable sections of the population; 
that it does not activate the land market in any significant way and, in particular, it 
does not cause a reversal of land fragmentation processes nor does it lead to a 
better allocation of land (in many cases, land buyers turn out to be absentee 
owners), that it does not perceptibly improve smallholders' access to credit (through 
the land collateral effect); and, finally, that there is no unambiguous indication that it 
stimulates land improvements and increases agricultural yields. 
 
In view of such evidence, a growing number of Africa specialists have come 
to share the view that, except in some particular circumstances where indigenous 
tenure systems are obviously unable to regulate access to land in an orderly 
manner (either because they do not exist, like in new settlement areas, or 
because traditional lines of authority have been severed and loyalties to lineage 
and communal groups eroded), the state should refrain from following the costly 
route of systematic land titling [see, e.g., Bruce, 1986; Atwood, 1990, Migot-
Adholla et al., 1991; Lawry, 1993; Saul, 1993; Bruce et al., 1994; Blarel, 1994; 
Platteau, 1996; Hesseling, 1992; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994). This is especially 
so because, under the joint impact of population growth and agricultural 
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commercialization, African rural societies do gradually evolve towards more and 
more individualized land tenure, that is, towards forms of land possession more 
suitable to an intensive agriculture that requires sizeable capital investments and 
land improvements is well as many husbandry skills and difficult-to-monitor labour 
efforts where quality matters a great deal. To formalize the newly emerging rights 
through a centralized procedure of land titling would thus involve heavy avoidable 
costs (particularly so in conditions of highly fragmented holdings as are typically 
observed in SSA) while bringing dubious benefits (which is obvious when land 
records hardly reflect the current reality because changes in land rights are too 
frequent and complex to be diligently recorded). 
 
As a consequence, rather than trying to overrule or supersede village 
communities and their indigenous land tenure arrangements through the 
imposition of a formal centralized system of regulation, African states ought to 
adopt an approach aimed at strenghtening local capacities for management, 
information and dispute settlement. Such an approach stressing cooperation and 
negotiation instead of confrontation with local communities would rest on the 
realistic assessment that they form living and continuously evolving systems that 
have at their disposal many effective means to preempt or subvert any change 
ushered in from without which has not met their prior approval. 
 
Although, as a matter of principle. we are sympathetic to this flexible 
approach that relies as much as possible on informal decentralized mechanisms, 
there is a basic fact that cannot be overlooked: when land pressure becomes too 
strong and there are no alternative outlets for the excess numbers depending on 
land resources. no mechanism, decentralized though it may be, can succeed in 
deflecting or suppressing the tensions arising from land scarcity. Whatever the 
adaptability of indigenous land tenure systems under conditions of changing factor 
endowments, the evolving land rights will sooner or later lead to a stalemate if the 
creation of viable income opportunities through technical advances in agriculture 
or the expansion of non-agricultural employment is not rapid enough to catch up 
with population growth. 
 
In such circumstances where the evolutionary mechanism is more successful 
in adapting rights and rules than in creating new income-earning possibilities, the 
absence of vigorous public intervention aimed at correcting this partial 
evolutionary failure is bound to lead to a crisis situation in which the new rules 
themselves cannot any more regulate the relations between people and the 
scarce assets. Chaos ensues because stress is so acute that the prevailing rules 
or practices come increasingly to be viewed by many people as profoundly unfair, 
implying that they lack the basic attribute of a rights system, that is, social 
recognition by others or mutual agreement in the sense of "equal and reciprocal 
respect" [Buchanan, 1975: 12). The task set for the present paper is precisely to 
illustrate this disheartening possibility with specific reference to the tragic case of 
Rwanda and, more particularly, to a very densely populated area of that country. 
In that area, indeed, land pressure had reached (before the recent civil war) such 
alarming proportions that the customary system of land tenure could not any more 
cope satisfactorily with the current challenges in spite of profound transformations 
induced from within. As will be suggested, this deadlock is not unrelated to the 
appalling bloodshed that devastated Rwanda in April 1994. 
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Study area and methodology used 
 
The study area is located in the northwestern part of Rwanda which is 
among the country's most fertile regions (since its soils are volcanic) but also 
among the most densely populated ones. It belongs to the commune of Kanama in 
the Prefecture of Gisenyi and corresponds to the lowest administrative unit known 
as the rellule (cell). It is worth stressing that the cell surveyed (henceforth denoted 
by N) is particularly privileged because it is situated closely to the administrative 
centre of the commune, to an important school centre (with both primary and 
secondary cycles), to one of the most active markets of the region, and to the 
main road link between Kigali (the capital city) and Gisenyi (on the border with 
Zaire). In 1993, N comprised 596 inhabitants, to be compared with 509 inhabitants 
in 1988, an increase corresponding to an annual growth rate of 3.290. The 
corresponding population densities are exceptionally high: 787 persons per 
square kilometer in 1993 as against 672 in 1988. 
 
Agriculture constitutes the dominant occupation in N. Beans and sweet 
potatoes are the mainstay of local subsistence production (maize is clearly on the 
decline) while bananas (for beer-making), tea and coffee (the latter in a declining 
proportion) are the most significant cash crops. Like elsewhere in Rwanda, 
agricultural techniques remain rudimentary: the hoe is still the main tool used by 
the farmers and modern inputs (e.g., compost, chemical fertilizers, new seed 
varieties) are very rarely used in the production process. Intensification of 
agricultural practices is clearly not sufficient to satisfy food requirements for many 
households and this compels them to look for alternative income-earning 
opportunities'-. In Kanama commune, it has been estimated that only 77% of 
calorie, 73% of protein and 1590 of lipid needs are currently met, which is 
comparatively low even in terms of Rwandan standards (Government of Rwanda, 
1988]. Many pastures have been graduallly converted into agricultural lands and 
cattle has practically disappeared from N3. Finally, given the tragic events that 
were soon to break out, it bears emphasis that the population of N is ethnically 
homogeneous, all the people (except one woman) heing Hutus. 
 
This study seeks to characterize the impact of land tenure individualization 
and the rising incidence of market transactions on the social fabric of village 
communities subject to rapid population growth. In other words, while many recent 
studies have predominantly dealt with the effects of tenure security on agricultural 
yields and investment, the present effort will focus on equity impacts, variations in 
tenure security, and the distribution of land rights. This implies that attention be 
drawn to land conflicts and litigation so as to better identify the points of tension 
that are created by rising land pressure. In particular, exclusionary processes 
need to be highlighted as well as the respective roles of indigenous modes of 
access to land and market transactions in shaping these processes. 
 
A thorough understanding of these issues requires a kind of information that 
is especially hard to come by because it concerns the sphere of private relations 
between individuals who may be closely related. To win the inhabitants' trust, a 
long period of immersion in their daily life experiences is necessary and 
participant observation must complement data collected more formally through the 
usual channel of survey questionnaires. This is why one of the authors (C. André) 
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spent about sixteen months in N in two different periods separated by a five-year 
interval (1988-1993). The second, actually longer period spent in N enabled us, 
besides gathering new information on aspects left aside in the earlier period (such 
as daily patterns of household expenditures and asset transactions), to follow up 
and to systematize the collection of certain informations collected in 1988 (on 
landholdings, land transactions, land disputes, credit and incomes). Particularly 
noteworthy is the fact that in the latter survey year land disputes have been 
carefully recorded from a day-to-day observation of events occurring in all the 
sampled households over a course of almost one year (whereas in 1988 
information about them was obtained by just calling up the memory of the 
households surveyed). 
 
The remainder of the paper comprises two main sections followed by a 
conclusion. In section 11, the distribution of landholdings and the way it is 
influenced by market-mediated modes of land acquisition are examined. This is 
with a view to determining whether population pressure has led to to an 
"involution" process affecting all local people more or less similarly, or, else, to the 
marginalization or even exclusion of some categories of insiders. In the latter 
eventuality, one of the main advantages of indigenous systems of land tenure would 
be destroyed, namely that of providing economic security to all the group members, 
which should be regarded as a positive contribution in a generally insecure economic 
environment4. After a brief summary of the main findings obtained so far, this line of 
inquiry is actually pursued in section III where land conflicts are scrutinized in order to 
check whether marginalization and exclusion can occur not only via the market but 
also through re-interpretations or restrictive applications of indigenous land customs 
and practices. Our findings are then used to put the civil war which tore the country 
apart during 1994 into the right perspective. In Section IV, the conclusive part, policy 
implications are drawn and, in particular, the question is asked whether the 
establishment of formal private property rights could have alleviated land-tenure 
problems both from an efficiency and an equity points of view. 
 
II Patterns of landholdings and the impact of land transactions  
 
Farm Sizes and bind Fragmentation 
 
Our sample for the year 1993 comprises 87 households out of a total of 124 
households living in N (that is, a proportion of 70%) while the size of our 1988 sample 
is 56 households out of a total of 108 (a proportion of 52%). In constructing the 
samples, we have partially followed the 'permanent population' approach in the sense 
that we ignored all households which joined or left the hill of N during the period 
1988-1993 but retained those which splitted or persisted after the father's death in the 
same period. Note that two household heads passed away between our two survey 
years and both of them owned comparatively large amounts of land in 19885. The 
lands of one of these households were inherited by the (unique) son who formed his 
own household after his father's death. As for the lands of the other deceased 
household head, they were transferred to non-residents (following a land dispute 
which prevented the sons to inherit) and were therefore subtracted from the land 
asset base available to N residents in 1993. Allowing for splitting households, we find 
that 57 of the households included in the 1993 sample can be traced hack to the 
1988 sample. Note carefully that, for the year 1993, there are no substantial 
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differences in the results whether they are based on the restricted sample of 57 
households coming from the 1988 survey or on the larger set of 87 households 
actually interviewed in 1993. By retaining the larger sample, we do not therefore alter 
the outcome of the permanent population method while we make maximum use of 
the data available to us. 
 
In Tables I and 2 below are displayed the distributions of lands owned and 
operated by the sampled households of N according to the size of the landholdings 
in the two survey years. Table 3 provides complementary informations about 
the distributions of land. including the Gini coefficients and the average 
number of parcels per household. 
Table l: Distribution of Owned Form Land Areas As Per-Size Class 
A Year 1988 
Owned farm 

















0.00-0.25 20 35.71 % 10.52 % 0.135 0.030 
0.26-0.50 20 35.71 31.26 0.401 0.079 
0.51-0.75 8 14.29 19.08 0.613 0.149 
0.76-1.00 5 8.93 16.03 0.823 0.118 
> 1.00 3 5.36 23.11 1.979 0.424 
Total 56 100.00 % 100.00% 0.459 0.094 
 
B Year 1993 
Owned farm 

















0.00-0.25 39 44.83 % 15.34 % 0.151 0.032 
0.26-0.50 22 25.29 21.70 0.379 0.065 
0.51-0.75 14 16.09 21.11 0.578 0.104 
0.76-1.00 5 5.75 10.98 0.842 0.140 
> 1.00 7 8.05 30.87 1.691 0.257 
Total 87 100.00 % 100.00% 0.441 0.083 
 
 
A number of important features emerge from the tables 1-3. First, 
there is a high incidence of quasi-landlessness in N and this incidence 
increases rapidly: thus, in 1988, 36e7v of the sampled households owned 
less than one-fourth of an hectare (which is really a low amount, even 
taking account of the very high fertility of the region's volcanic soils) and, 
five years later, this proportion had climbed to about 45%. At the other 
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end of the distribution spectrum. the proportion of households owning 
more than one hectare has risen perceptibly between the two periods 
(from about 5% to 8%n). Moreover, the maximum size of owned farm area 
increased by sixty percent in the same time interval. These: two 
characteristics have determined a perceptible increase in the inequality of 
landholdings as measured by the Gini coefficient: indeed, the value of this 
coefficient rose from 0.411 to 0.4366. This ominous tendency is confirmed 
by the sensible fall in the median size of owned farms from 0.356 to 0.295. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Operated Farm Land Areas as Per Size Class  
 
A. year 1988 
Operated farm 

















0.00-0.25 16 28.57% 9.26% 0.157 0.035 
0.26-0.50 22 39.29 32.63 0.403 0.083 
0.51-0.75 9 16.07 20.01 0.603 0.143 
0.76-1,00 6 10.71 18,56 0,840 0.123 
> 1.00 3 5.36 19.54 1.768 0.332 
Total  56 100.00% 100,00% 0.485 0.099 
 
B. year I 993 
Operated farm 

















0.00-0.25 32 36.78 % 12.53 % 0.147 0.034 
0.26-0.50 26 29.88 24.39 0.353 0.062 
0.51-0.75 17 19.54 26.48 0.587 0.105 
0.76-1.00 4 4.60 8.84 0.832 0.165 
> 1.00 8 9.20 27.75 1.306 0.187 
Total 87 1 00.00 % 100.00% 0.433 0.082 
 
























Owned land 0.459 0.007 2.332 0.356 0.411 9.64 
(1988)      (0.048) 
Operated 0.485 0.007 2.387 0.410 0.357 9.36 
(1988)      (0.052) 
Owned land 0.441 0.007 3.733 0.295 0.436 9.64 
(1993)   (0.046) 
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Operated 0.433 0.007 1.555 0.317 0.389 10.01 
(1993)      (o 043) 
Note:  Between brackets are given the average Sires of individual land parcels. 
Second. the 1988 distribution of landholdings (foes not dominate the 
1993 distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance: this results 
from the fact that the cumulative distribution function for the former year 
crosses the cumulative distribution function for the latter year from below7. 
This is evident from table I since the proportion of households owning less 
than half an hectare appears to have (slightly) declined between 1988 and 
1993 while the proportion of those owning less than one-fourth of an 
hectare has concomitantly (and significantly) increased (see supra). Figures 
la (for owned lands) and Ib (for operated lands) presented in Appendix 
show clearly that when the cumulative distribution curves are drawn on the 
basis of individual household data (there is no preliminary regrouping of the 
data into size classes), the 1988 and 1993 curves intersect at several 
points. The absence of first-order stochastic dominance means that there 
can be no unanimity about which distribution is preferable to the other: 
some will manifest a preference for the 1988 distribution while others will 
reveal an inclination towards the 1993 distribution [Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 
1995: 87]. 
 
To raise the question of second-order stochastic dominance comes 
down to asking whether, over the whole range of land sizes in the 
distribution, the deficit curve (obtained by integrating over the cumulative 
distribution for land) for one distribution lies nowhere above the deficit 
curve of the other while lying at least somewhere below [Atkinson, 1970]. 
Since there is a close relationship between second-order stochastic 
dominance and Lorenz dominance - the former can be regarded as the 
'primal' and the latter as the 'dual' of the problem [Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 1990] - and since a Lorenz curve is a more intuitively 
appealing concept than a deficit curve, we will work with this more familiar 
curve. A relationship of Lorenz dominance can be clearly detected from a 
comparison of the Lorenz curves obtaining for 1988 and 1993 not only 
when the curves are drawn on the basis of the (five) discrete land size 
classes used in tables I and 2 but also when they are calculated from 
individual household data. As can indeed be seen from figure 2 (based on 
individual data) shown in Appendix, the 1988 distribution of owned lands 
Lorenz-dominates the 1993 distribution8. The same conclusion does not 
however obtain for operated lands, yet it is only near the higher extremity 
of the distribution that the 1993 curve cuts the 1988 curve from below. 
 
Third, landholdings are extremely fragmented since, on an average, a 
household farm in N consists of as many as ten plots of land (see table 3, last 
column). An immediate consequence of this situation is that parcels of land are 
minuscule (measuring less than 0.05 ha in 1993, for both owned and operated 
lands)9. Note that the average size of operated parcels has fallen perceptibly 
between 1988 and 1993. 
Fourth, the average (mean) size of household farms (whether owned 
or operated) has decreased between 1988 and 1993, yet this decrease is 
less 
 12
important than the decline in the average amount of land available per person 
(compare the first column of table 3 with the last column of tables 1 and 2, A and 
B)10. This discrepancy arises because the average size of households in N has 
significantly increased between 1988 and 1993: thus, while a household contained 
4.87 persons. on an average, in 1988, this number rose to 5.28 persons 1993. What 
this finding seems to indicate is that growing land hunger has the effect of making it 
increasingly difficult for young adults to leave their parents and to set up their own 
household. Thus, it is revealing that the average size of households headed by 
relatively old persons (more than fifty years of age) increased appreciably between 
1988 and 1993 (from 3.95 to 4.26); as will be seen later (table 14), the rise is much 
more important still when only households headed by persons in their fifties are 
considered. The presumption is therefore that youngsters in the lower 
landownership classe, marry later and later owing to a lack of inheritable land and 
to insufficient opportunities to acquire additional land through the market. Since we 
do not have data about ages at marriage, the proportion of children in age of 
marriage who are still living with their parents is used as a proxy. As is evident from 
table 4, the proportion of boys living with their parents has increased perceptibly 
between the two survey years, whether we consider youth belonging to the 20-25 or 
to the 25-30 age category11. As shall be argued in the next section. such a 
situation is not without creating serious tensions between older and younger 
members of the households. 
 
Table 4 : Proportions of Children in Age of Marriage Still Living with their Parents, 
1988 and 1993 
 
Year  Children aged 20-25 years  Children aged 25-30 years  
Boys   Girls   Total   Boys   Girls   Total  
 
1988   71.4%  39.9%  48.0%  20.0%  18.2% 19.2%  
1993   100.0%  66.7%  80.5%  33.3%  8.3%  16.7%  
 
 
The above situation is not specific to N but has characterized the whole 
region during the eighties and early nineties. In the words of Jennifer Olson: 
"Meanwhile, population densities continued to increase but the outlet of migration 
became less of an option since almost all land in the East had been claimed and 
settled. The capital city Kigali offered some opportunities for educated young people 
but jobs were restricted because the economy had grown very slowly. The result 
was that income earned by farmers declined, that the number and proportion of 
extremely poor farmers increased, and that many young people were unable to 
afford marriage and foresaw a bleak future for themselves" [Olson, 1995: 219]. 
 
Fifth, the incidence of various sorts of temporary land transfers (land rentals, 
loans and possessory mortgages) in N is not large, especially in the latter year: as a 
matter of fact, contrary to expectations, lands rented in (or borrowed or taken under 
a mortgage contract) as a percentage of lands operated in our sample has 
decreased dramatically from about 11% in 1988 to barely 570 in 1993 (see infra, 
table 8). A plausible explanation for this atypical evolution is the following: rising 
tensions arising both from more and more acute scarcity of land at the local level 
and from dangerously increasing political instability at the national and regional 
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levels have made people increasingly wary of getting involved in land rental 
transactions. 
Land rentals and other temporary transfers have had a moderate impact 
on the situation of the lowest landowning groups. As is evident from a 
comparison of tables I and 2. the proportion of households with less than one-
fourth of an hectare is somewhat smaller when operated rather than owned 
lands are considered (297• as against 36/v in 1988 and 3790 as against 45% in 
1993). As for the (cumulative) proportion of households with less than half an 
hectare, it also falls, but only slightly, when allowance is made for land rentals: 
from 7170 to 68.0% in 1988 and from 70% to 67% in 1993. In addition, the 
average farm size per household member in the quasi-landless group increased 
from 0.030 to 0.035 ha in 1988 and from 0.032 to 0.034 ha in 1993 through 
non-sale land transactions. Also, the median farm size for operated lands is 
larger than for owned lands, more significantly so in 1988 when the incidence of 
these transactions was relatively important (see table 3). Finally, we expect to 
see the role of nonsale land transactions as a factor mitigating land endowment 
differentials to be reflected in lower Gini values for operated lands. This is 
confirmed in table 3 from where it is apparent that the Gini value has decreased 
by more than 1070 between owned and operated lands. The same finding 
comes out of a comparison of Lorenz curves for both types of lands in either 
year: the distribution of operated lands Lorenz-dominates the distribution of 
owned lands (see Figure 2 in Appendix). 
The importance of off-farm monetary incomes 
 
Since most landholdings are so small and since no technological breakthrough 
has occurred in agriculture to drive land productivity up in a significant and 
continuous manner, it is evident that the residents of N must rely on off-farm 
incomes to be able to make ends meet. An idea regarding the incidence of 
alternative income sources and its relationship to landownership position can be 
gleaned from table 5. A first thing to note is that a large majority of the sampled 
households currently earn off-farm incomes, whether from wage labour or from 
independent craftsmanship (carpentry, brick-making, etc): this was the case for 
almost 6370 of them in 1988 (35 out of a total of 56 households) and for 69% of 
them in 1993 (60 out of a total of 87). If attention is limited to regular off-farm 
incomes only, these proportions decrease to 48% (27/56 households) and 45% 
(39/87), respectively. Yet, if we club together the households currently earning 
regular off-farm incomes with those which earned such incomes for at least five 
consecutive years some time in the past but do not earn them any more in the 
present (see column 7 in table 4), the proportions work out to 71% (40/56 
households) and 64% (56/87), respectively. 
 
As for the relationship between the ownership position of the sampled 
households (in 1988 and 1993) and access to regular off-farm incomes, it is u 
priori ambiguous since it is the net outcome of two contradictory forces, one 
running from ownership position to off-farm incomes and the other one going in 
the opposite direction. Indeed, on the one hand, households located at the lowest 
rungs of the landownership ladder are those most in need of complementary off-
farm incomes and they are therefore expected to be most actively searching for 
the corresponding employments. Yet, on the other hand, households with good 
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access to off-farm employment opportunities can use the proceeds of the incomes 
thus earned to purchase land and enlarge their farms. When the first effect 
outweighs the second effect, off-farm incomes cause incomes to equalize between 
unequally endowed households while, in the reverse case, they strengthen 
inequality by giving rise to a cumulative process of land accumulation in the hands 
of the better-endowed households. For the latter result to obtain, a crucial 
condition is that off-farm income opportunities, especially those of the regular 
type, are rationed and that, in the process of rationing, a category of people 
(particularly, those without the right connections or without the professional skills 
and experience) are discriminated against. 
 
The results displayed in table 5 show that it is the latter eventuality that 
prevails in N. As a matter of fact, contrary to what is generally observed in 
Asia (see, e.g., Ho, 1979: 91-2, for Taiwan), the average farm size for 
households which have no history of regular off-farm incomes and currently 
earn only farm incomes is significantly lower than the earning regular off-farm 
incomes or having earned such incomes in the past for at least five 
consecutive years (statistical significance is obtained at 1% confidence level 
for both survey years)12. Thus, the area owned per household with present 
or past experience of regular off-farm incomes was 0.51 ha in 1993 (0.55 ha 
in 1988) to be compared with less than 0.20 ha for other types of households 
(0.24 ha in 1988). Differences in ownership position remain significant when 
the area owned (or operated) per household member is considered instead 
of the area per household. On the other hand, differences between farm 
sizes owned or operated by households with no experience of regular off-
farm incomes (see column S) and those owned or operated by households 
which currently earn irregular off-farm incomes (see columns 3 and 4) are 
not statistically significant. Again, this result holds true whether the average 
farm size is calculated in terms of households or in terms of household 
members 
 
It is worth noting, however, that in the 1993 sample the biggest landowner 
earned only agricultural incomes and did not have any history of regular off-farm 
incomes. By including it in column's 5 type, we would have increased the variance 
to such an extent that all comparisons with other categories would have been 
completely distorted (see the footnote below table 4). It must therefore be borne in 
mind that the conclusion stated above hold true, for 1993, only because we have 
ruled out an a-typical case. Granted this exception, it is correct to say that in N 
households with no access to regular off-farm income opportunities are 




Table 5 : Land Areas Owned and Operated Per Household and Per Person in 1988 and 1993 According to Availability of 
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no history 










































 Nr of hholds 15                   12 1                  7 8 13 40 16
 0.456            0.506 0.205         0.276 0.198 0.690 0.547 0.237
 
Area owned 
per hhold (0.224)              (0.431) (0)         (0.148) 0.139) (0.654) (0.473) (0.144)
 0.492            0.645 0.477         0.307 0.222 0.578 0.566 0.280
 
Area oper. 
per hhold (0.216)              (0.455) (0)        (0.143 0.155) (0.554) 0.428) (0.158)
 0.081            1.012 0.041       0.047 0.042 0.204 0.116 0.045
 
Area owned 
per person (0.035)              (0.082) (0)       (0.019) (0.052) (0.157) (0.116) (0.037)
 0.088                 1.290 0.095      0.052 0.047 0.171 0.121 0.053
 
Area oper. 




% of hholds 
which 
bought land 
80.0%                 75.0% 
(12/15)              (9/12) 
100.0%         14.3% 
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  Wages      crafts 
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Hholds with 
no history 






































Nr of hholds 12                  27         5                  16 9 17 56 30 
0.478                  0.514 0.184           0.213 0.160 0.534 0.512 0.198 Area owned 
per hhold 0.396)                (0.349) (0.143)       (0.197) (0.049) (0.388) (0.354) (0.159)
0.509                   0.534 0.244          0.224 0.197 0.541 0.531 0.219Area oper. 
per hhold (0.399)               (0.336) (0.181)        (0.197) (0.056) (0.335) (0.350) (0.166)
0.072                   0.087 0.042             0.041 0.047 0.121 0.091 0.043 Area owned 
per person (0.055)               (0.059) (0.012)        (0.069) (0.074) (0.106) (0.082) (0.067)
0.076 .                 0.091 0.055            4.31 0.052 0.123 0.095 0.042Area oper. 
per person (0.054)               (0.057) (0.024)        (0.069) (0.072) (0.106) 0.081) (0.066)
% of hholds 
which 
bought land 
66.7%                81.5% 
(8/12)                (22/27) 
   20.0%              18.7% 










Notes:  Al stands for Agricultural Incomes; ROFI for Regular Of Harm Incomes: IOFI for Irregular Off-Farm Incomes. On the other 
hand, we consider that a household has a history of ROFI if it could earn regular off-farm incomes during at least five consecutive years 
some time in the past. Note that the households referred to in columns (1) and (2) are obviously comprised of households that have a 
history of ROM and of households that have no such history. 
 
(**) This category actually comprises 10 and not 9 households. We have excluded one household because it is so a-typical that its 
inclusion would have considerably distorted the whole picture presented by the group to which it belongs. Thus, for example, the land 
area owned per household would have worked out to 0.534 ha instead of 0.160 ha and the standard deviation would have been as high 
as 1.067 ha. 
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The modes of acquisition of hot land 
Many empirical studies converge to show that in Sub-Saharan Africa 
the major mode of land acquisition continues to be inheritance. This is true 
even in countries where such mode of acquisition is more likely to lose 
importance, namely countries where land titling programmes have been 
more or less systematically implemented in the countryside (Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia) and in countries characterized by high 
population densities (Kenya. Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi). Table 6 below 
presents in a synthetic manner the findings of' a number of case studies 
regarding the relative importance of two modes of land acquisition: 
inheritance and various kinds of gifts on the one hand and purchases 
through the market on the other hand. These studies have been 
conducted in sixteen different areas located in six countries possessing at 
least one of the two aforementioned characteristics (Kenya, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia). 
 
Table 7 reports the same findings for our own study area. Two striking 
results emerge from the inspection of tables 6 and 7. First, the role of 
purchases in the formation of land property is much larger in N than in 
most other locations for which similar data are available (in fact, only in 
Uganda is this role slightly larger): in 1993, the proportion of parcels 
acquired through purchases was two and a half times as high in N as the 
average proportion calculated over the sixteen areas referred to in table 
6. Moreover, when our results are compared specifically with those of a 
World Bank study on three areas of Rwanda (Gitarama, Butare, and 
Ruhengeri), we find that, as a mode of acquring land, purchases are 
considerably more important in N than in these three other locations: on 
an average, their incidence is more than 3-4 times larger in the former 
than in the latter areas  (depending on which year is considered). The 
swine holds true, albeit to a lesser extent, for Burundi. Second, changes in 
the distribution of lands owned by mode of acquisition are astonishingly 
rapid in N: As a matter of fact, the proportion of parcels acquired through 
purchases has increased by as many as nine percentage points in a short 
interval of only five years. The increase is still more important when 
measured in terms of total area. Combined with the findings of table 5, this 
suggests that land ownership position depends more and more on the 
ability to earn regular off-farm monetary incomes and less and less on 
forefathers' wealth transmitted through inheritance13. 
 18
Table 6 : Motles of Acquisition of Land: Evidence from 16 areas located in 
six different countries (Kenva, Rwanda, Burundi. Uganda, Malawi, Zambia). 
 
 Percent of parcels acquired through:    Inheritance or gifts                          Market purchases 
All six countries   
(16 areas)  
range 3 1-94% 0-45% 
average 62.8% 16.1%
median 61.5% 14.5% 
Rwanda   




Burundi   
(4 areas)   
range 44-91% 0-25% 
average 68.% 15.5% 
median 68.5% 18.5%
Source: he lahle has been constructed on the basis of the following sources: Migot-Adholla rt pit., 
1991: 162; Migot-Adholla et tit. , I994b: 126: Swallow, 1994: 16. The sixteen areas funning the sample 
are distributed thus: four in Kenya (Madzu, Lumakanda, Kianjogu. Mweiga). four in Burundi (Giharo. 
Giheta. Matana. Muhuta); three in Rwanda (Ruhengeri, Butarc. Gitarama): two in Uganda (Mpigi, 
Kahalc) and Zambia (Southern, Eastern): one in Malawi (Iilongwe). 
 
 
It bears emphasis that the rapidly increasing activity of the land market in N 
takes place in spite of its largely illegal character. As a matter of fact, for land 
under customary or occupancy rights, sales are allowed only if the seller can 
prove that he would retain at least two hectares of land so as to be able to 
ensure the subsistence of himself and his family. As for the buyer, he will get 
the necessary authorization from the government only if "he can provide a 
valuable reason for acquiring land such as not being already in possession of 
a landholding exceeding two hectares in size..." (decree n° 09/76 of 1976, 
March 4, art 3 and art 82-83). In other words, below a critical size of two 
hectares. land property is permitted to be neither alienated nor subdivided 
or fragmented [for more details, see Ruhashyankiko, 1985: 15-18, 
Gasasira, 1993]14. From the pattern of landownership highlighted in table I, 
it is evident that all sales of land parcels in N are in violation of the law: 
local inhabitants are too poorly endowed in land to be allowed to part with 
some of 415. 
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Table 7 : Distribution of Owned land by Mode of Acquisition, 1988 and 1993 
 





















 Inheritance 360 18.030 0.050 66.67% 70.18% 
 Gifts 10 0.277 0.028 1.85 1.08 
 Purchases* 170 7.383 0.043 31.48 28.74 
 Total 540 25.690 0.048 100.00% 100.00% 
 
B. Year 1993 
















Inheritance 457 20.912 0.046 54.47% 54.52% 
Gifts 41 2.244 0.055 4.89 5.85 
Purchases* 341 15.204 0.045 40.64 39.63 
Total 839 38.360 0.046 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: * Purchases include tang obtained through foreclosure 
A last comment is in order: lands acquired through foreclosure are 
included in market purchases. Unfortunately, our data do not allow a precise 
demarcation between parcels purchased and parcels foreclosed. In actual 
fact, the distinction is not always easy to make because, as the market value 
of the parcel mortgaged is typically higher than the amount of the 
corresponding debt, a lender who forecloses on it must usually make a 
complementary cash payment to the defaulting borrower, which is interpreted 
as a purchase. Moreover. when land parcels are foreclosed, the lenders 
concerned may choose to dispose of them in the market instead of keeping 
them to enlarge their own property16. This is necessarily true of all land 
parcels foreclosed which had been mortgaged to local tontines (informal 
rotating savings and credit associations) in order to insure participants 
against the risk of free riding on the part of anyone of them. In the event of 
failure (a participant stops contributing to the deposit scheme once he (she) 
has received the whole pot), indeed, the land mortgaged by the free rider is 
seized by the club and, since it is physically impossible to divide it among the 
other members (whose number may be as high as twenty), it is sold in the 
market and the sale proceeds are then shared among the cheated 
participants. This being said, the evidence available to us shows that land 
foreclosure is gaining ground in N and that such acts are attested by written 
documents. 
 
As we already know, the incidence of land rentals and other forms of temporary 
land transfers is relatively small in N and was actually declining in a significant 
manner between 1988 and 1993. A precise idea of this phenomenon can be made 
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on the basis of table 8 where distributions of land operated by mode of access are 
displayed for both survey years»17. 
 
Table 8 : Distributions of Operated area by Mode of Access, 1988 and 1993 
 
A. Year  1988 
 
 


















 Permanent transfers 531 23.909 0.045 91.71% 88.76% 
 Inheritance/Gifts 361 16.526 0.046 62.35 61.35 
 Purchases 170 7.383 0.043 29.36 27.41 
 Temporary transfers 48 3.030 0.063 8.29% 11.24% 
 Land borrowals 11 1.132 0.102 1.90 4.20 
 Possessory 12 0.496 0.041 2.07 1.84 
 Land rentals 25 1.402 0.056 4.32 5.20 
 All access modes 579 26.939 0.046 100.00% 100.00%
 
B. Year 1993 
 
 


















 Permanent transfers 828 35.799 0.043 95.06% 95.06% 
 Inheritance/Gifts 487 20.595 0.042 55.91 54.69
 Purchases 341 15.204 0.045 39.15 40.37 
 Temporary transfers 43 1.862 0.043 4.94% 4.94% 
 Land borrowals 13 0.630 0.048 1.49 1.67
Possessory 8 0.248 0.031 0.92 0.66
 Land rentals 22 0.984 0.045 2.52 2.61 
 All access modes 871 37.661 0.043 100.00% 100.00%
 
The low share of land borrowals and land rentals is particularly noteworthy 
because these ways of acceding to land were quite pervasive until rather recent 
times: outmigrants. old or sick persons, families with excess land would lend or rent 
out parcels to land-hungry people against jugs of banana beer and various kinds of 
services IM. On the other hand, relatively few lands are held under possessory 
mortgage, which is not a widespread practice in N. 
 
The Avequalizing impact of the land vales market 
Before inquiring into the reasons that drive people to sell land, a natural 
question to ask is whether activation of the land market has the effect of mitigating 
or accentuating inequalities in land endowments. In order to answer to this question, 
a useful way to proceed consists of decomposing the Gini coefficients (for 1988 and 
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1993) so as to measure the (percentage) contributions to overall inequality of land 
properties of inequality in each of the two following components: inheritance and 
gifts on the one hand and market purchases on the other. The calculating procedure 
followed is the standard one of writing the overall Gini as the weighted average of 
the pseudo-Ginis for the kill source of land property with the weights corresponding 
to the share of that source in the total amount of land owned W. 
 
Table 9 : Decomposition of Gini Coefficients by Mode of Acquisition of Land Owned, 
1988 and 1993 
 
Year Gini coeff. 
Inheritance and gifts 
 
Gi          G*i        w*i              Pi 
Market purchases 
 
Gm       G*m        W*m      Pm 
1988 0.411 0.470      0.439    0.713      76.1 % 0.396     0.342     0.287    23.9% 
1993 0.436 0.508      0.385    0.604      53.31% 0.666     0.514     0.396    46.7% 
Note: p, stands Ior the percentage contribution of inequality in the kill land component to total 
inequality in land owned. For the other symbols used in the table, see the explanation in the 
text. 
From the results displayed in table 9, it can he seen that if inheritance and 
gifts account for the major part of the inequality of landholdings in N, the share 
of that component source is rapidly diminishing. Put in another way, the 
percentage contribution of market purchases to overall inequality of land 
distribution has increased tremendously. starting from less than one-fourth in 
1988 to approach one-half in 1993. 
It may be borne in mind that [see Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 1978]: 
G = w, Gi* + w„,G*„ = W , R,G, + Wm R „,G„ 
 
where Gt stands for the true partial Gini coefficient for the kth land component 
(k=i,m where i refers to inheritance and gifts and m to market purchases); G*, 
stands for the pseudo-Gini; W,, is the weight corresponding to the relative 
share of the kth land component in the total amount owned; and Rk= COR(LK, 
rL)/COR(LK, rL) where the numerator is the coefficient of correlation between 
the amount of land obtained from the kth source and household ranking for all 
lands owned while the denominator is the correlation coefficient between the 
same amount of land and the household ranking for owned lands of the kth 
type. From table 9, it is apparent that the rising percentage contribution of the 
market component to total inequality in landholdings is the outcome of three 
forces: (1 °) the weight of the market component increased noticeably 
between 1988 and 1993, causing a corresponding reduction in the weight of 
the inheritance component; (2°) the partial true Gini coefficient for the market 
component increased much more than the inheritance component; and (3") 
the relative correlation coefficient R, (equal to the pseudo-Gini divided by the 
true Gini for the kth component) decreased appreciably for both the market 
and the inheritance components (from 0.864 to 0.772 and from 0.934 to 0.758, 
respectively). 
 
Table 10 brines complementary evidence of the disequalizing impact of 
land sales transactions in N. There are clear tendencies emerging from this 
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table. First, a majority of households did buy land at some point of their 
history: 66% in 1988 and 599 in 1993. Furthermore, almost all households 
belonging to the three higher landholding groups were in this situation 
compared to only about one-third for the lowest group. Second, a high 
proportion of households in all landholding groups happen to have sold some 
land in the past, yet the overall proportion has significantly increased between 
1988 and 1993 (from slightly more than one-half to more than two-thirds). 
Third, from information gathered in 1988, we find that more than one-third of 
the quasi- land less households (owning less than one-fourth of an hectare) 
did sell land some time in the past but could never afford to buy any; by 
contrast, the proportion falls to 15% for households owning between one-
fourth and one-half of an hectare and to 6%> for those owning more than one-
half. Differences are still more striking in 1993 since, by then, almost one-half 
of the quasi-landless households were found to be exclusively land sellers 
whereas the proportions were 27% and hardly 4%, respectively, for the other 
two (higher) household categories. Fourth, especially from the 1993 data, it 
appears that land purchased as a percentage of total land owned is much 
smaller in the lowest landholding group than in all the other groups. 
Particularly worth noting is the following fact: the second lowest landholding 
group (owning between 0.25-0.50 ha) is poorly endowed despite the fact that 
more than 40%r of its lands have been acquired through market purchases 
(whether in 1988 or in 1993). 
 
Table 10 : Incidence of Land Transactions As Per the Current 


















































 0.00-0.25 20 7 10 3 7 17.8% 
 0.26-0.50 20 16 9 6 3 43.0
 0.51-0.75 8 7 6 6 0 21.2 
 0.76-1.00 5 5 2 2 0 48.3 
 > 1.00 3 2 2 1 1 7.1

















































0.00-0.25 39 12 27 8 19 25.6% 
0.26-0.50 22 16 15 9 6 41.3
0.51-0.75 14 13 8 8 0 35.8
0.76-1.00 5 4 2 1 1 47.4
> 1.00 7 6 7 7 0 45.3
Total 87 51 59 33 26- 1 39.6% 
 
Table I 1 confirms the crucial link between position on the land market 
and access to off-farm income opportunities. It can indeed be seen that in 
both survey years a large majority of the sample households with either a 
present (first row) or a past experience (second row) of regular off-farm 
incomes (ROFI) have been able to purchase land. This is actually true for all 
of those which earned such incomes during at least five consecutive years in 
the past In fact, the minority of households presently earning ROFI and having 
not yet bought land are all households which have enjoyed access to these 
opportunities for only a short time. Conversely, less than one-fifth of the 
households with no past or present experience of ROFI have purchased land 
some time in their life cycle. On the other hand, at least half of them are in the 
predicament of having sold land without having ever been able to buy any. By 
contrast, this is true for relatively few of the households presently earning ROFI and 
for none of those which could earn ROFI during at least five consecutive years in 
the past 
 
Table I1 : Relation Between Position on the bind Market and Access to Off-
Farm Income Opportunities, 1988 and 1993 
 
Access to off-farm 
income opportunities 
Proportion of hholds 
which bought land 
Proportion of hholds 
Which sold land but did not buy any 
1.Among hholds





2 Among hholds with
an history of ROFI and 
currently earning only 





3 Among hholds with
no present or past
experience 
of ROM 
1988: 3/16 (18.7%) 
1993: 4/31 (12.9%) 
1988: 8/16 (50.0%) 
1993: 20/31 (64.5%) 
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Motives.for land sales 
 
In order to understand the motives which drive the inhabitants of N to participate so 
actively in the land market and, in particular, to offer land for sale, 247 cases of rather 
recent land sales have been investigated. Note that the households concerned do not 
necessarily belong to our sample. A classification of the reasons called up by these 
households to account for their parting with land parcels is presented in table 12. 
 
The most striking result is the very large incidence of distress sales: indeed, as many 
as 65% of land sales have been motivated by the need to finance emergency 
expenditures, to repay debts or to meet social exigencies. Especially worth singling out 
is the fact that in more than 30% of the cases it is the sheer need for survival that has 
forced the household to part with a fraction of its landholding, In addition, almost 17%
of land sales have occurred because the household had to incur litigation expenses
usually connected with land disputes or to pay various kinds of fees (including bribes
paid to judges with a view to influencing court decisions). Under the category 
"inconsiderate consumption" are included all cases where the proceeds from land sale 
went to financing superfluous consumption expenditures (including drinking). sparking 
off complaints about wealth dilapidation among local villagers. Bear in mind that
distress sales may (partly) correspond to land foreclosures (see supra, pp. 17-8), and 
this may not be true only for Situations where debt repayment is the cause of the loss
of land. On the other hand, in about one-third of the 247 cases of recorded land 
sales, there is a good presumption that efficiency has been increased. This is
particularly likely to be so when lands are sold because they are badly located 
(usually due to excessive distance from the owner's house), because the owner
wants to rationalize his property - these two cases represent roughly 10% of the total
-, or because he aims at reallocating his wealth (16% of the cases), such as when he 
uses the sale proceeds to construct a new house, to finance a migratory move or




Table 12 : Motives for Land Sales (on the basis of a sample of 247 land 
transactions ) 
 
 frequency percent 
A. Distress sales 
Subsistence consumption (food and health) 
Social expenditures (baptisms, funerals, 
weddings)* 
Inconsiderate consumption 























Bad location of the land** 






Old age and lack of manpower 
Bad duality of the land 
Good market conditions 






























Total 247 100.0% 
Notes: * This includes transport costs incurred to visit relatives on social occasions 
(one case). 
** In almost all the cases. the problem mentioned is the distance of the 
land parcels from the house which makes protection difficult against the risk 
of thetts. 
Table 13 is based on records of land sales made by our 1993 sample 
of 87 households. It is designed in a way that allows to test whether there 
exists a relationship between the motives for selling land (either distress 
circumstances or other motives) and the present size (in 1993) of the 
seller's landholding. It is noteworthy that three-fourths of land sales 
have been distress sales (an even higher proportion than in the sample 
used in table 12). Also, distress sales are not concentrated in the 
lowest landholding groups, thereby indicating that households are 
losing property at all rungs of the ownership ladder20. Some particulars 
deserve to be mentioned. Thus, in the 0.51-0.75 size group, out of 15 
distress sales, 12 concern land parcels which have been sold to meet 
food needs (one parcel) or to finance health expenditures (11 parcels) 
by old persons earning only agricultural or irregular off-farm incomes. In 
the 0.76-1.00 group, six out of the seven distress sales concern the 
same old person who comes from a founder (big landowning) lineage 
and gradually disposes of his property in order to pay for his food (2 
parcels), health (3 parcels) and fee (I parcel) expenditures. He earns 
only agricultural incomes. Finally, in the highest size group, five of the 
six distress sales concern again a same person who is compelled to sell 
his land (he earns only agricultural incomes) to meet food (I parcel), 
health (3 parcels) and social (1 parcel) expenditures. 
 
Table 13 : Motives for Subs of Land Parcels As Per Size Class of Owned Farms 















67 29 15 7 6 124 Distress 
sales (82.7%) (80.5%) (57.7%) (87.5%) (37.5%) (74.2%) 
14 7 11 1 10 43 
 
Other 
motives (17.3%) (19.5%) (42.3%) (12.5%) (62.59 o) (25.8%) 
 26
81 36 26 8 16 167 
 Total (100.0%) (100.0%)  (100.0%)  (100.0%), (100.0%) (100.0%) 
 
It could be argued that sales of land to meet subsistence needs in old 
age are not genuine distress events in so far as old persons dissave by 
disposing of assets accumulated earlier in their life cycle. (In other words, 
land sales in old age could be the outcome of intertemporal welfare 
maximization). This is nevertheless ignoring that, due to such disposals. the 
lands passed down to younger generations tend to shrink further and further, 
thus giving rise to increasing intergenerational inequality of landholdings. As 
will be seen now and in the next section dealing with land disputes, this is a 
serious problem that lies at the heart of many tensions in the everyday life of 
N’s inhabitants. 
 
Intergenerational inequality of landholdings 
Table 14 sets out to explore possible relationships between the 
age of household heads and the size of landholdings. The exercise is 
actually quite conclusive since it shows clearly that households headed 
by relatively old persons have much more land per household member 
than younger households. Thus, in 1988, the average amount of land 
owned (operated) per person when the household head is between 20-
50 years of age was 0.070 (0.085) ha compared to 0.152 (0.137) ha for 
older households (whose heads are at least 50 years old). For 1993, the 
figures are, respectively, 0.067 (0.065) ha and 0.119 (0.122) halt. All 
these differences are statistically significant at 5% confidence level. In 
1988, the relationship between age of the household head and land 
owned per person is continuously positive whereas in 1993 the latter 
starts to diminish once household heads pass the 60 years threshold. 
However, land endowment per person in this highest age category 
remains significantly larger than in the 20-50 years age groups (and the 
difference between the two higher age categories remains statistically  
Table 14 : Household Head Age Groups and their Owned ar Operated 
Faun Area per Household and per Household Member, 1988 and 1993 
A . I988 








Owned Farm Area 
per                  per 
   hhold            person 
(in ha)
Operated Farm Area 
per                per 
hhold          person 
(in ha) 
 20-29 yrs 11 4.09 0.266              0.065 0.360             0.088 
 30-39 yrs 17 5.76 0.394             0.068 0.461             0.084 
40-49 yrs 8 6.38 0.505             0.079 0.519             0.081 
50-59 yrs 11 4.09 0.457             0.112 0.475             0.116 
 > 60 yrs 9 3.78 0.778             0.206 0.804              0.166 












Owned Farm Area 
Per                 per 
Hhold          person 
            (in ha) 
Operated Farm Area 
Per                            per 
Hhold                      person 
                  (in ha) 
7 2.86 0.145 0.051 0.172 0.060 
22 5.64 0.344 0.061 0.371 0.066 
28 6.71 0.509 0.076 0.454 0.068 
6 6.00 0.834 0.139 0.822 0.137 





z 60 yrs 
Total 87 5.28 0.441 0.083 0.433 0.082 
 




The following salient conclusions emerge from the above empirical analysis. 
First, there is rising inequality of land endowments and, more worryingly, increasing 
incidence of absolute poverty resulting from quasi-landlessness coupled with 
absence of regular off-farm incomes22. As a matter of fact, access to regular off-
farm income opportunities tend to accentuate rather than mitigate inequalities in 
land endowments through the operation of an active (and illegal) land market (which 
implies that customary restrictions on land sales have largely disappeared) where 
many land parcels are sold under distress conditions and purchased by people with 
regular non-agricultural incomes. Therefore, rather than a process of "involution" 
what we find at work in N are dispossession mechanisms driving vulnerable 
sections of the population (people deprived of access to regular off-farm incomes) 
below the subsistence margin. Second, the aforementioned disequalizing processes 
occur at such a breakneck pace that change is clearly perceptible even within a 
short time interval of only five years. (According to some reports, land distribution 
remained relatively equal in Rwanda until the early eighties). Third, the ability of 
land rental markets as well as traditional forms of temporary land transfers to 
correct inequalities in land endowments seem to be rapidly diminishing. Fourth, 
children tend to stay longer and longer with their parents and to delay their marriage 
for lack of land where to set up an independent household. Fifth, there is a rising 
intergenerational inequality of landholdings that reflects the increasingly difficult 
situation in which younger households are being trapped when it cannot rely on 
alternative income opportunities. 
 
In the following, we intend to go beyond the quantitative evidence 
summarized above in order to get a better understanding of the way social relations 
are affected in a society caught in the predicament of growing population pressure 
on land resources. In particular, we want to know whether the rising inequality in the 
distribution of lands obtained through inheritance and gifts (see table 9) is a 
reflection of an increasingly exclusionary character of evolving customary rules of 
land tenure. As a matter of fact, it is not only through distress sales (or through land 
foreclosure) that people may lose land but also through loss of customary rights of 
access. A detailed analysis of occurring land conflicts is actually a privileged way to 
obtain reliable answers to that question and, more generally, to gain deep insights 
into the social crisis crippling the rural society under study. 
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Ill. Land disputes, social crisis and violence An 
Overview 
 
Careful observation of everyday life in N reveals a large incidence of 
all sorts of conflicts, ranging from land-related disputes to conjugal 
tensions, non-fulfilment of (implicit) contractual obligations and thefts. 
Moreover, a good number of these conflicts lead to emotional outbursts of 
anger and bouts of sheer violence (under the form of destruction of 
assets, thefts, threats of poisoning and physical assaults with machetes) 
which official authorities cannot always repress. Generally, however, 
conflicts are resolved through customary channels or, possibly, by appeal 
to official "modern" agencies although tensions and hatred often subsist 
between the contending parties. In many of the cases handled by the 
latter agencies, it is noteworthy that losers are compelled to sell land 
parcels to pay all the costs involved (including the fines imposed by the 
judge). This finding bears out the evidence presented earlier (and derived 
from a large sample of land sale transactions) that litigation expenses and 
tines constitute an important cause of distress sales of land (see supra, 
table 12). 
Table 15 : Incidence and Characteristics of Conflicts in N 
 
Nature of conflicts Source A* Source B** 
Land disputes around 28 41.2% 72 45.6% 
Succession 11 16.2% 36 20.3% 
Land transactions 9 13.2% 16 10.1% 
Land boundaries 8 11.8% 24 15.2% 
Interpersonal conflicts 22 32.3% 53 33.5%
Conjugal conflicts 10 14.7% 28 17,7% 
Other conflicts 12 17.6% 25 15.8% 
Other conflicts 18 26.5% 33 20.9% 
Thefts 4 5.9% 12 7.6% 
Debt defaulting 4 5.9%n 15 9.5% 
Wandering of animals 3 4.4% 5 3.2% 
Others 7 10.3% 1 0.6% 
(Total  68 100.0%  158 100.0% 
Notes: *The conflicts in this column air those which have been referred 
during the period running from January 1993 to January 1994 to either of the two 
sampled mediators operating in N (there are four mediators in total). 
** The conflicts in this column are those in which the households 
belonging to our 19<)3 sample reported to have been involved recently or 
in the past. 
Table 15 allows us to have a rough idea about the relative 
importance of various types of conflicts as assessed from two different 
investigation methods: (i) a day-to-day recording, by two mediators (out 
of the four existing in N), of all the disputes referred to them during a 
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one-year period (from January 1993 to January 1994), and (ii) a specific 
inquiry among the 87 households comprising the 1993 sample about the 
conflicts in which they themselves have been involved. Assuming that 
half of the conflicts are reported to the two sampled mediators, we reach 
the conclusion that there has been more than one conflict per household 
(68X2/124), or about one conflict every three days during the year 1993. 
These are truly high ratios given the fact that only serious conflicts are 
referred to mediators who call for many witnesses and give a public 
character to their procedures and judgements. The number of conflicts 
recorded according to the second approach (see source B in the table) is 
obviously an underestimate of the reality owing to the limitations of the 
interview method for questions that possibly involve a recall of events 
located in a distant past 
This being said, it is striking that the relative shares of various types of 
conflicts does not differ significantly between the two methods used to 
assess them. Yet, it must be emphasized that in both cases the relative 
incidence of land disputes is grossly underestimated. This is because many 
interpersonal conflicts (including conjugal conflicts) have as their root cause 
a contest about land rights. It is therefore certain that at least half of the 
conflicts breaking out in N arise from land problems. Notice that such a 
conclusion is a far cry from that reached by Blarel (on the basis of a study of 
three different locations) for whom the incidence of land disputes is low in 
Rwanda and land tenure security is fairly high as a result [Blarel, 1994: 86-
7]2?. Our surmise is that so discrepant findings cannot be entirely explained 
by the comparatively high population density in our survey area. Most 
probably, they also arise from exclusive reliance on recall method of data 
collection in the World Bank survey on which Blarel's analysis is based. 
The nature and effects of land disputes 
(i) Disempowerment of vulnerable groups through the market 
Not unsurprisingly, the rapidly rising incidence of land market 
transactions documented in the previous section (see tables 7 and 9) has the 
effect of eroding mechanisms of social insurance which traditionally operated 
through the land tenure system. This is simply because customary 
obligations attached to lineage lands, in particular obligations to redistribute 
land in favour of land-scarce kith and kin, cease to apply when the lands are 
acquired through purchase instead of being handed down within the lineage. 
For instance, a resident of N refused to give a parcel of land to his sister who 
came back to her village after having separated from her husband. He thus 
violated a custom aimed at preventing social destitution among women who 
have lost access to land (bear in mind that women are allocated land for 
usufruct as wives in their husband's lineage) and this he did on the ground that 
he built up his whole property by purchasing land on the market 
 
(ii) Exclusionary trends in indigenous land tenure. 
 
Even within the category of lineage lands rules of access and rights of use 
tend to be defined more and more restrictively as land becomes scarcer. More 
precisely, the evolution of indigenous tenure arrangements involves increasing 
exclusion of vulnerable categories of the population which were socially protected 
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under erstwhile customary rules. This holds especially true for return migrants, 
separated or divorced women, wives under polygamous arrangements, widows, 
handicapped children, orphans, children of broken marriages and whose father has 
remarried. For example, orphans are still accommodated by their grandparents, yet 
upon the death of the latter they risk being excluded from the (patrilineal) 
succession. Not very dissimilar is the situation of children of broken marriages: they 
also live with their paternal grandparents and they suffer from their half-brothers' 
attempts to evict them from access to the lands of the patrilineage. Or, separated 
women coming back to their native village along with their children may find their 
brothers opposing their return lest there should be too little land left for patrilineal 
descendants. Widows seem to be in an especially difficult position: at least, they 
often express insecurity feelings and continuous fear of reprisals from their 
brothers-in-law who tend to view her children as competing claimants for the 
lineage's land. 
 
(iii) The decline of customary marriages and its effects. 
 
In some instances, customary rules have apparently not evolved and poor 
people tend to suffer from this situation because these rules are more and more 
difficult to abide by. A vivid illustration is provided by the case of young villagers 
who evade erstwhile marriage customs because their parents are too poor to make 
the wedding gifts traditionally pledged to the wife's family in order to seal the 
alliance thereby contracted (the inkwano). According to our estimate, roughly two-
thirds of the couples in N. have been married without inkwano, and the proportion is 
obviously much higher among young couples. Under stress, the wives (when they 
separate from their husband) and children of these "illegitimate" couples are more 
vulnerable, the former because they have little bargaining power in their lineage 
given that their marriage did not bring wealth to their parents (especially, the male 
elders whose privilege it is to negotiate the inkwano) and the latter because 
children of non-customary unions are less and less recognized as legitimate 
descendants either by the father's or the mother's lineage 24. Traditionally, these 
children were considered to belong to the mother's lineage. Yet, owing to acute land 
scarcity, their customary rights are increasingly called into question by maternal 
uncles and this is why it has become common practice for the mother to return to 
her lineage accompanied only by her daughters (since they do not compete for 
land). The sons are thus left with their father with all the attendant risks of being 
denied access to his lineage's lands. A genuine vicious circle of poverty is therefore 
at work: children of poor parents cannot get married according to the custom, which 
makes them more liable to lose security of access to land and to become landless, 
thereby perpetuating or accentuating the poverty of their parents. 
 
It would be wrong to believe that the above types of' conflicts are always 
resolved in a manner contrary to the interests of the vulnerable sections of the 
population. When a land dispute is referred to customary mediators, the solution is 
generally grounded in the basic principle (typical of justice in all traditional societies) 
that social order and cohesion ought to be preserved. This may or may not imply 
that the vulnerable party will be proven right Whenever possible, a decent 
compromise will be worked out which implies that the customary rights of vulnerable 
persons are encroached upon, at least to some extent 
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When a conflict is brought before an official court, the outcome is likewise 
indeterminate. This is partly due to the fact that official judges may take 
traditional mores into account while pronouncing their judgements. When 
referring instead to the formal law, they will favour vulnerable persons in some 
cases but not in others, depending on the type of conflict Thus, for example, 
wives from polygamous marriages (except the first one) will have no chance to 
win a case because they are not legitimate wives under the modern law (since 
May 1952). Contrariwise, chidren from unions without inkwano but duly 
registered with the civil authorities will afford more protection under an official 
trial than under a customary procedure. In addition, official judges are too 
often prone to corruption through connections or bribes (known in local 
parlance as ruswa) and this obviously makes the weaker and poorer party 
more likely to lose the case. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that official judges 
base their judgements on the evidence of written documents, whenever these 
are available. This is likely to favour educated persons and also dubious 
persons who do not hesitate to produce false documents or documents written 
under duress. Yet, in some cases, vulnerable persons who are evidently well-
informed may resort to written procedures to protect rights which they know 
are being increasingly threatened. 
(iv) Intra-family conflicts. 
 Without any doubt, the most disquieting and socially disruptive land 
disputes occurring in N are those which oppose father and sons and thereby strike 
deep at the heart of family life. To understand this, it is useful to briefly recall the 
local pattern of land inheritance and its evolution during the last decades. As 
already pointed out, the mode of succession is patrilineal. Traditionally, upon the 
death of the father, the land was passed on to the elder son who was expected to 
manage the family assets in the interests of the family (under a form of corporate 
ownership). This implied that he granted to his younger brothers enough land to 
allow them to subsist As land scarcity increased and rights over land became more 
individualized, direct transmission to all sons became the norm and the prerogatives 
of the elder son became limited to the role of settling intra-family conflicts. As a 
reward, he was entitled to an additional share of the lineage land. Today, even this 
practice is being increasingly opposed and the request is for strictly equal sharing of 
the land between all the sons.  
 Another important evolution is reflected in the earlier apportioning of 
family lands between sons. This evolution is the result of two concomitant forces: 
the children's desire to emancipate themselves from the father's rule and to manage 
their own assets even when their father is alive (which is more and more true 
whether the sons are married or not), on the one hand, and the latter's concern to 
avoid devastating conflicts between brothers upon his death, on the other hand. 
Under the present circumstances, a son receives some land from the father upon 
his marriage and a more definite allocation takes place as soon as the last son is 
being married. The inheritance process is complete only when, upon the father's 
death, the lands which he had retained for his own use is distributed.  
 The above arrangement gives rise to two main sources of land 
disputes. First, elder sons may resist the withdrawal of lands over which they have 
been previously granted use rights (at the time of their marriage or even later). Such 
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withdrawals are more and more frequent because respect of the equal sharing rule 
in a context of extreme land scarcity implies that some land must be redistributed 
from elder to younger male members of the family. As a matter of fact, it often turns 
out that the father has given to the elder sons more land than they can be awarded 
under this rule. This situation can be caused by an unanticipated increase in the 
number of children (bear in mind that polygamy is a widespread practice) or by the 
reduction of the total lineage land following market sales by the father. For the same 
reasons, adjustments in the land parcels held by the different sons can possibly 
take place during the period between the first and the last marriages.  
 Second, serious tensions may develop between father and sons 
because, being land-hungry and pushed to the subsistence margin, the latter may 
consider that the land retained by the former for his own use is too large given his 
present subsistence needs. As a result, and against a deep-rooted taboo, they may 
then demand that additional land parcels be redistributed to them. Likewise, 
children may contest the right of their father to rent out land to a stranger while they 
are themselves lacking property. It is worth recalling here that the farm area owned 
or operated per household member has been found to be significantly smaller 
among young than among old households (see supra, table 13). Note that, when 
some part of the land has been acquired through purchase, it is easier for tire 
father to withstand the pressure exercised by his sons to obtain more parcels. The 
message conveyed to them is then that, if they need more land, they will have to 
fend for themselves and to find a way to buy it as he himself did. 
 
Mutual understanding is all the more difficult as the strategy of the father is 
likely to be influenced by feelings of insecurity which drive him to retain some land 
as precautionary savings. Such feelings are actually encouraged by the erosion of 
arrangements of old age support following the equalization of status among all the 
sons. Traditionally, indeed, the youngest son was bearing special responsibility for 
the subsistence of his father during old age, and, in return, he was entitled to an 
additional parcel upon his death and had the right of first choice during the 
ultimate apportioning of the father's lands. Nowadays, these rights and duties of 
the youngest son have largely fallen into disuse. Also, conflicts arise because 
when a father had to sell a land parcel to meet expenditures caused by the 
misdeeds of a son (such as when he had to pay a compensation for a theft 
committed by his son, or to get him released from jail on bail) he usually subtracts 
this parcel from his inheritance share. All occasions thus cause suspicions, 
frustrations and antagonisms to grow between the two generations, thereby 
embittering and poisoning the core of family life. Scarcity of land is so acute that 
the passing away of parents brings considerable relief to the successors and 
parents have painful feelings of neglect and abandonment during their old age. 
 
Like in the cases mentioned under points (ii) and (iii), examination of stories 
of land disputes between father and sons shows that the outcome is subject to 
variation. Sometimes, the father gives in to his sons' requests because he 
believes they will sooner or later seize parcels through sheer force. Or, on the 
contrary, he may feel strong enough to resist their pressures. When the matter is 
referred to them, local mediators may accept or reject the sons' claims for further 
redistribution of the (living) father's lands depending on the prevailing 
circumstances as they are deemed to affect the ability of both parties to survive. 
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Thus, for example, a mediator sided with a poor young villager by requiring his 
father to rent out a land parcel to him rather than to a stranger. Note that such a 
solution represents a compromise in so far as the father is not requested to give 
the land to his son, in accordance with an old social norm providing that (lineage) 
land can be transferred only upon the father's death (see supra). Finally, sons 
may bring the case before an official court and, in one instance at least, the 
father's refusal to grant parcels of land to his children was disavowed by the 
judge. 
 
Intergenerational disputes also revolve around land gifts made by a father to 
his daughters during his lifetime. According to custom, a father may indeed give 
land (called ingobyi or icyali) to a daughter on the occasion of the birth of a new 
child. Opposition from the sons is especially strong if they are badly in need of 
land 25 and if their sister chooses to sell the land received. Moreover, conflicts 
often arise when a daughter receives amalira land ("land for the tears") from one 
of her parents to console her for the death of the other parent Finally, heated 
argument takes place if the sons suspect or discover that their father has 
promised to donate land (e.g., in a written testimony) to a person (a daughter or a 
non-relative) who attends to him during his old age. Hostility from the sons is 
generally all the more violent as they are convinced that caring strangers are 
opportunists guided by the secret hope of inheriting their father's land upon his 
death. And there is actually no doubt, as interviews with caring strangers reveals, 
that such is indeed the motive driving most of them in their dealings with old lonely 
persons. 
(v) Insecurity of land tenure. 
 From the above account, it is evident that customary land . 
arrangements are heavily disputed, thus making many land rights increasingly 
insecure. This holds true, in particular, for vulnerable categories of persons who 
represent a significant and growing proportion of the population. To counter the 
threat of land withdrawal, members of these groups choose not infrequently to sell 
the disputed land. Such behaviour, it should be noted, only shifts the problem to 
the buyer who may not be aware of the dispute at the time of purchase. When, on 
the other hand, the person with contested claim is extremely eager to keep the 
land (say, because his house is located on it), securization of his right is 
sometimes achieved by buying the land from the person who disputes his claim to 
it Under these circumstances, contrary to what happens when the land is 
surreptitiously sold, land security is restored with all the attendant beneficial 
effects on efficiency and investment 
The civil war in the context of extreme land pressure 
Rural communities are far from being the havens of peace and the models of 
altruistic behaviour which they are depicted to be in popular accounts inspired by 
a romantic view of indigenous life. Often concealed behind the veil of multiple 
reciprocal exchange arrangements, there are often at work pervasive tensions and 
rivalries that must be carefully held in check to avoid disruptions of social order. 
As rightly pointed out by many anthropologists, social peace and collective 
survival are the ultimate end of predominant modes of apparently altruistic 
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exchange which actually serve to bind people together by ties of mutual obligation 
[see, e.g., Belshaw, 1965; Sahlins, 1974; Bourdieu, 1980; Evans-Pritchard, 1940; 
Gregory, 1982; ]. In N, however, collective survival and social peace appeared to 
be under severe threat at the time of our field study (as early as 1988). Due to 
extreme scarcity of land and to the harsch realities of struggle for bare survival, 
tensions had developed to such an extent that the social fabric was at the risk of 
falling asunder. This dreadful diagnosis is grounded in plain evidence of more and 
more numerous land disputes which proved increasingly difficult to settle 
satisfactorily (in spite of the efforts of local mediators anxious to preserve social 
order and to prevent economic deprivation and social destitution), which penetrated 
into the very heart of family life and led to disquieting displays of violence. An 
atmosphere of fear and isolation undoubtedly reigned in N, compounded by the 
ominous rise of a more and more uncontrollable group of young thieves and 
delinquents (often but not always landless youth with no access to regular income 
opportunities)'26. This was so much true that local inhabitants would forbid their 
children to go into the house of some neighbours or relatives for fear that they could 
be hurt or poisoned. 
 
The Northwest (Ruhengeri and Gisenyi) region of Rwanda to which N 
belongs was particularly involved in the outburst of violence which tore the 
country apart in 1994. First, it gained the most from president Habyarimana's 
rule (since it was his home region) and had therefore the most to lose from the 
Arusha agreements which provided for a good amount of power-sharing with 
the opposition and the RPF (the Rwanda Patriotic Front dominated by Tutsis 
in exile). Second, having had a different history in which they escaped the 
Tutsi king's rule, it considers itself unlike the rest of the country and had 
always been especially hostile to the Tutsis27 Third, being very near to the 
site of the 1990-1994 RPF armed incursions, it has been living in fear of the 
RPF [Olson, 1995: 220]. 
 
The reasons which led to the civil war are obviously complex and it is not 
the purpose of this paper to discuss them in any detail. What we want to 
emphasize is just that the prevailing state of extreme land hunger created an 
enabling environment which made the most desperate people (particularly 
young people with only bleak prospects) ready to seize any opportunity to 
change their present predicament Moreover, the climate of violence which 
had got a hold over the people in the area produced the right predispositions 
and circumstances for the slaughter that was to ensue. After the bloodshed 
was over, we tried our best to get information about people from N who had 
survived the traumatic events. This necessitates a special trip to a refugee 
camp in Zaire where such people or investigators who worked with us could 
be met From talks with them, we have been able to reconstruct a list of the 
people who died during the war. This list is not complete since no news could 
be obtained about a number of people. Yet, it is sufficiently complete to allow 
us to use it with a view to determining whether people were killed 
haphazardly and, if not, which are the specific characteristics of those who 
passed away. Table 16 presents the results of that exercise. 
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An unexpected clear picture emerges from this table. As a matter of fact, 
victims of the 1994 events seem to belong to one of the following three categories 
of people. First, we find persons (or children of persons) who were not well 
accepted socially or whose success was resented before the civil war broke out 
Among the main reasons why they were disliked or feared are the facts that they 
enjoyed relatively large landholdings or that they were considered as trouble-
makers. In the former group are either old persons who had accumulated much 
land or relatively young persons (less than 50 years) who could purchase 
numerous land parcels thanks to their having access to regular off-farm income 
opportunities. To the latter group belong the people suspected and accused of 
thefts and poisoning, or notoriously involved in many land disputes. All together, 
this category represents as much as 54 percent of the casualties of the civil war. 
This suggests that the 1994 events provided an unique opportunity to settle 
scores28 or to reshuffle land properties29, even among Hutu villagers, a well-
known but ugly feature of all civil wars. This also holds true with respect to  
 
Table 16 : Relevant Characteristics of N's People Killed during the 1994 Events 
(incomplete list) 
 
Personal characteristics frequency percent 
Persons with comparatively large land property 
- old persons (> 50 years)' 
- persons who had aroused jealousy and 
hatred owing to their relative success 
- Tutsi 
Persons considered to be trouble-makers 
Land-poor and malnourished people 




















Total 28 100.0% 
Notes: People are considered to he old when they have children to age to marry and, 
therefore, when tensions over land can arise between father and sins. 
* Four people out of these seven belonged to the same family whose father, mother and two 
adolescent children were killed; ** two persons in this group belonged to the same family 
(one father and a child); *** four out of these seven persons were children. 
 
old people (among which victims was a local mediator) since local inhabitants do 
not believe they have neccessarily died of natural causes 30  
 
Note that one Tutsi woman lived in N and was the first to be killed. She was 
actually the victim of a failed murder attempt by an anti-Tutsi young radical in 
January 1993. Yet, it is probably a simplification to view her assassination as a 
purely racial act As a matter of fact, she was hated for many reasons, particularly 
because she came from the south of the country and was therefore considered to 
be a stranger, and because she inherited a relatively large land property upon the 
death of her husband of whom she was the fourth wife (an anomaly in a society 
where women do not inherit from their husband)31. She was involved in many land 
disputes which were clearly not of her own making32. Revealingly, the only 
witness of the 1993 murder attempt refused to say what he had seen before local 
arbitrators. 
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The second category of persons who fell victims of the war were young 
people (all in their twenties) who engaged in militias and were thus directly 
involved in the massacres and the fightings. It is not clear how exactly they were 
killed and, even here, the hypothesis that some of them were eliminated because 
they were trouble-makers cannot be ruled out a priori. (At least three of the five 
youth reported in our list were shady characters: two of them were landless people 
who used to commit thefts in order to survive while the third one was a violent 
radical who actually attempted to murder a Tutsi woman in January 1993 - see 
supra). This category accounts for 18 % of the war casualties. 
 
Finally, the third category, which makes up one-fourth of the victims, 
corresponds to very poor people who were clearly malnourished before the war 
broke out Four out of the seven persons listed under that category were children. 
It is likely that all these people could not go through the harshness of war times 
owing to a lack of physical resistance and financial reserves. 
III Conclusion 
As has been pointed out in the introductory section, evidence available 
for Sub-saharan Africa does not suggest that the absence of formal private 
property rights over land is a serious hindrance to agricultural investment and 
land conservation. This is all the more likely to apply to our study area as 
people possess well-individualized rights and usually secure land tenure. 
When this happens not to be the case, by buying parcels subject to 
contestation (if such an option is feasible), a villager may establish 
incontrovertible claims, since as a rule land sales transactions are attested by 
written documents elaborated in the presence of witnesses, which normally 
ensures the validity of the transfer effected. Clearly, the main problem is not 
that people have insufficient incentives to carry out new investments but rather 
that new technical packages liable to increase land (and, possibly, labour) 
productivity in a significant manner are not available to them. 
 
In a context of extremely rapid expansion of numbers such as is observed 
in Rwanda, boserupean processes of privately induced innovations cannot be 
expected to be able to match population growth [Platteau, 1995]. If public supply 
of technical innovations suitable for intensive agriculture proves to be also 
deficient, swift creation of non-agricultural income opportunities and/or drastic 
measures to bring down fertility rates become necessary to relax the pressure of 
numbers on limited land resources. When such steps are not taken, a rural society 
like N is dragged into the Malthusian trap and falls prey to extremely dangerous 
centrifugal tendencies that undermine the very basis of social life and strike deep 
at the heart of family life. It is illusory to think that formal private property rights 
recorded in an official land registry following a procedure of land titling can provide 
a solution to the problem. On the one hand, there is no reason to believe that 
formalization of land rights could in any way reduce the incidence of distress sales 
of land. If anything, it is the opposite outcome that should be expected. Moreover, 
it is unlikely that land rental transactions could be thereby stimulated given the 
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climate of extremely severe social tensions engendered by acute land scarcity and 
macro-level political instability. 
On the other hand, unequalizing tendencies do not only stem from market 
processes but also from increasingly exclusionary applications of indigenous land 
practices. This said, the picture which emerges from our analysis is quite complex 
because while in some instances customary rules still serve to protect the 
interests of vulnerable sections of the population, or at least to mitigate the most 
anti-social consequences of individualization tendencies, in other instances they 
may have the opposite effect In the latter circumstances, formal laws can 
sometimes help to redress inequalities (e.g., official courts recognize the 
inheritance rights of children born of legally married couples even if customary 
marriage rituals have not been abided by), yet it is not clear why land titling as 
such should be necessary to achieve more equal allocation of rights of access to 
land. 
Now, even assuming that some positive effects can be derived from 
formalization of land rights, on the grounds of efficiency or equity, they have to be 
set against the considerable costs which land titling programs involve, particularly 
so in conditions of highly fragmented landholdings (such as have been observed 
in N). Indeed, the experience available amply shows that cadastral surveys are 
often incomplete and there is a lack of diligent record keeping of all intervening 
changes in land ownership. As a result, land records hardly reflect the current 
reality, thus destroying the utility of the whole operation33. We are therefore on 
solid grounds to argue that the government of a country like Rwanda (and its 
foreign donors) would be better advised to use the scarce public resources 
available by diversifying economic activities and sources of employment as well as 
by promoting agricultural research and extension than by attempting to establish 
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I This applies not only to Kenya but also to other countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Somalia [Harrison. 1992: Roth et at, 1994: 224-51 as well as to 
Ghana (Besley, 19941. 
 
2. For a study of soil degradation resulting from an insufficient intensification 
process to support the added number of people in the Highland prefecture of 
Gikongoro, see Olson, 1994. 
 
3. Disappearance of cattle is due to several factors. the most important of which 
are the lack of grazelands, the threats of cattle thefts. and the imposition of 
permanent stalling by the government. 
 
4. Other advantages usually ascribed to indigenous systems of land tenure are 
their flexibility and the fact that they economize on transaction (including information) 
costs. 
5 One of them owned 2.33 ha and the other one 1.96 ha, which places 
them in the upper ownership strata of N. 
6 Note that even the latter Gini value is lower than Gini values 
calculated for Murang'a district. about 80 km northeast of Nairobi [Pinckney and 
Kimuyu, 1994: 191. The comparison is instructive in so far as, like N, Murang'a is 
characterized by exceptionally high population density and is relatively favourably 
located with respect to market outlets. This said, it must he stressed that a Gini 
value of 0.436 is very high given the fact that Rwanda's rural society was known 
to be comparatively egalitarian even during the seventies, a feature which was 
reflected ill a relatively egalitarian distribution of land. It is apparently during the 
eighties that asset and income distributions started to deteriorate (Maton, 1994). 
Note that in the ease study of a village located in the South of the country (not far 
from Butare), the Gini coefficient measuring the inequality of income distribution 
was recently found to be as high as 0.53 (Marijsse el at., 1994 :271. 
 
7. That the 1988 distribution cannot dominate the 1993 distribution in the sense 
of first-order stochastic dominance does immediately follow from the application of a 
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well-known theorem (see. e.g., Eeckhoudi and Gollier, 1995:88]. According to this 
theorem, indeed, for a random variable y to dominate another variable x in the sense 
of first-order stochastic dominance, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that E(y) > E(x). 
From table 1. it is evident that the average size of landholdings in 1988 was actually 
smaller than that obtaining in 1993, a finding that will soon be commented upon. 
 
8 Bear lut mind that the concept of second-order stochastic dominance (or, 
equivalently, that of Lorenz dominance) is less requiring than that of first-order 
stochastic dominance: first-order implies second-order stochastic dominance but not 
vice versa. 
9. For the sake of comparison, notice (flat a recent World Bank study of four 
areas in Kenya (no doubt a heavily populated country) shows that the smallest 
average parcel size is 0.53 ha [Migot-Adholla et tit., 1994b: 125[. To 
understand such an enormous difference, it must he remembered that the area 
of our study possesses volcanic soils which are highly fertile. 
 
10 The considerable fall in the latter is due to a large extent to the 
aforementioned transfer of a comparatively large property to non-residents following 
the death of a household head between 1988 and 1993. 
 
11 Note that the figures used in the denominators are not exact since our data 
miss the youth (boys and girls) who have left N in order to take jobs, follow training 
programmes or move with their husband outside the native hilt The percentages 
given in the table therefore overestimate the reality of dependence of children in their 
twenties vis-a-vis their parents. As a consequence, the only valid conclusion which 
can be drawn from the table is that, among the youth remaining on the native land, 
there is a tendency to stay longer and longer within the parental household. A direct 
implication of this finding is the following: if there has been an acceleration in 
outmigraiion (a phenomenon which we are unable ut) document), it has not proven 
sufficient to release the remaining youth from the pressure of numbers on N's lands 
and to get emancipated from parental tutelage as early as they would wish. 
12  Remittances from relatives working as regular wage-earners in rather 
distant places (mainly Kigali) are included in the first column of the table. 
There are no remittances from irregular employments in our sample.  
13  Note that variations in average size of individual parcels of land 
according to mode of acquisition are not statistically significant. 
14  Bear in mind that in Rwanda "all nonregistered land belongs it) the state 
on which individuals are granted exclusive private and inviolable usufruct 
rights, protected by the law" [Blare(, 1994: 81]. Yet, as a matter of principle. 
traditional land owners and tenants are allowed to convert their rights to full 
ownership by registering their land libidem; see also Ruhashyankiko. 1985: 12-
13]. In actual practice, however, this opportunity does not exist because 
registration procedures have not been established. 
15 The intense activity of the land market in N is perhaps also surprising 
given the fact that N belongs to an area of the country (the Highland 
Northwest) which long resisted the Tutsi rule in the pre-independence period 
and where, as a result, customary land tenure based on lineage ownership 
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was not directly attacked by the new agrarian relations of the patron-client 
type established by the Tutsi caille-owners [André, 1994: 202; Olson, 1995[. 
16 In reality, fenders are usually quite willing to enlarge their land 
property, yet the location of the parcels foreclosed may not be suitable and 
they may therefore prefer to sell them so that they can use the safe 
proceeds to acquire better situated parcels in the (active) land market. 
 
17 Operated land is obtained by subtracting from owned land the amount of 
land rented (or loaned) out or mortgaged to creditors and by adding the amount of 
land rented (or loaned) in or taken under possessory mortgage. 
 
18 Note that while in 1988 net renting in of land was positive the reverse was 
true in 1993. Also, the drastic decline in the percentage of total operated area 
rented in between the two survey years (from 11% to 5%) is largely due to the 
dramatic fall of the average size of parcels borrowed by the sample households 
(from roughly 0.1 to 0.05 ha). 
 
19. Bear in mind that the pseudo-Gini coefficient for a particular component of 
inequality is the Gini that would be obtained if households were ranked in terms of 
their total (rather than component) landholding.  
 
20  Since under distress conditions households usually sell one parcel of land 
at a time and since parcels are minuscule (see supra), descending down the five-
category ownership scale may actually take many years. The same actually holds 
true of households which are climbing up the ladder: they indeed accumulate land 
properly in a gradual manner by purchasing a land parcel as soon as they have 
earned enough regular off-farm incomes to be able to do so. Thus, if we measure 
mobility along the ownership scale between 1988 and 1993 (corresponding to a 
time interval of only five years), we trust expect it to he rather low. This is 
confirmed by looking at the transition matrix of per household distribution of land 
owned (not shown here) and by computing a summary measure of mobility such 
as the Distance Measure (MD) from this matrix. The value of MD is 0.054 and, it' 
The number of fracliles used in the transition matrix is raised from five to ten in 
order to follow more closely movements along the landownership scale, the MD 
value increases but only to 0.066. 
 
Bear in mind that the Distance Measure takes the extent of "off-diagonalness" 
or distance from the diagonal into account whelk representing the degree of 
mobility (Swaminathan. 1988; Lanjouw. 1992: 180-81[. The value of MD is equal 
to zero when all non-diagonal cells are empty and a value of one when mobility is 
perfect, i.e. when ones are observed in the cells along the diagonal from the top 
right hand corner to the lower left hand corner (except for the middle fractile), i.e. 
when the greatest distances have been jumped. It is formally defined as refers to 
the probability of occurring in the cell corresponding to row i and column j: n 
stands for the number of fractiles used in the transition matrix and max is the 
maximum value that MD can take on (when mobility is perfect). When  is odd, max 





21 Note that the average land owned per person is much lower in 1993 
than in 1988, which is due to the fact that an old person (a descendant of a 
founder lineage) who owned a considerable amount of land on N's scale died 
between the two survey years. Since. following a land dispute. all his lands were 
transferred outside N (instead of going to his sons). the land endowment per 
person in younger age classes was bound to decrease. Since this decline is 
nevertheless less important than the fall in endowments of older age classes, the 
agewise difference in land owned per person is smaller In 1993 than in 1988. 
22 According to some estimate based on aggregate data, the proportion of 
rural people with a dally intake of less than 1,600 calories has risen from hardly 9% 
in 1982 to a staggering 40%, in 1990 and much more in the following years. Even it 
these estimates have it) he considered with olmost caution. the incontrovertible 
fact remains that absolute poverty has increased at amazing speed since the early 
eighties in rural Rwanda. 
23 Blarel also writes that in Rwanda "the indigenous tenure systems seem 
to have adapted efficiently to the prevailing socioeconomic conditions" (BIarel. 
1994: 89[. 
24 For more details on the effects on children of the non-payment of the 
inkwano , see Ntampaka. 1979. 
 
25  We thus came across instances of disputes caused by the forced 
appropriation of icyali land by brothers who refuse to recognize the tight of their 
sister to such land previously donated by the father. 
 
26  In a revealing manner. before the war a statistically significant relationship 
was found between regional variations in the incidence of juvenile delinquency on 
the one hand and regional variations in per capita availability of calories on the 
other hand. As a matter of fact, together with population density, the latter 
variable explained as much as 58% of the regional variations in offences 
committed by persons between 21 and 25 years old (Mason, 1994: 27-8[. 
 
27  There were much fewer Tuisis and mixed marriages were much less 
common in the Northwest than in the South and the Center of the country.  
 
28  Thus, before the outbreak of the 1994 events. one of the poorest and most 
marginalized members of N was a person wrongly accused of a murder actually 
committed by a powerful lineage leader who was strongly "protected" during the 
investigation. As a result of the iniquitous judgement passed by an ill-informed 
official court, this member spent ten years in jail and lost all his property. Yet, the 
war enabled him to completely reverse the situation since, after the victory of the 
RPF, he became rich again and presently lives in a beautiful house. 
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29  It is not rare, even today, to hear Rwandans :ague that a war is necessary 
to wipe out an excess of population and to bring numbers into line with the 
available land resources. 
30 There is the possible exception of a very old man (aged 78 years) who is 
among the seven victims belonging to that category. 
 
31 Note also that her (Hutu) husband was not a native of N either since he 
migrated to N after having been forced to leave his native village by his half-
brothers. 
32 Among many (apparently fabricated) indictments, she was accused of having 
falsified her husband's testimony. Any pretext seemed good to threaten to kill her. 
sometimes openly. 
 
33 See, e.g.. Bruce. 1986: 58; Green, 1987: 11; Feeny, 1988: 295; Saul, 1988: 
273; Shipton, 1988: 123; Golan. 1990: 51; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994: 23; Migot-
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